In response to Peru's expropriation of the Peruvian properties and investments of the International Petroleum Company, a subsidiary of Standard Oil of New Jersey,' President Nixon warned that unless adequate, prompt, and effective compensation was paid to IPC by April 9, 1969, he would have no choice but to terminate both American foreign aid to Peru and Peru's quota of American sugar imports. 2 Peru subsequently charged that the United States was engaged in "economic aggression" and threatened to create a bloc of Latin American nations to oppose the economic interests of the United States. 3 Although many Peruvians, and others, would be incredulous, the President, who it is commonly supposed controls the conduct of American foreign affairs, was compelled to take the steps he did by congressional legislation: the so-called Hickenlooper Amendment to the Foreign Assistance Act 4 -the basic statute governing the United States' foreign aid program-and section 408(c) of the Sugar Act of 1948. s This article investigates the constitutionality of the Hickenlooper Amendment and other similar congressionallyimposed restrictions on the President's discretion 6 in foreign aid. It will be seen that the Constitution, as it has developed, has conferred upon the executive branch exclusive powers over a "core area" of decisions in the field of foreign affairs, and this article will explore the extent of this core and delineate the congressional controls or interference from which this core area is immune. What is involved is an examination of one aspect of the "separation of powers"; more specifically, a clarification of the interrelation of the independent powers of the executive in foreign affairs and the legislative powers of Congress, principally the appropriations power, with respect to foreign affairs. 7 Following a discussion in Part I of the constitutional development of standards affecting the separation of foreign affairs powers, this article will investigate in Part II the manner in which these powers have interacted in the area of foreign aid. Because
Congress can completely withold from the executive appropriations for foreign aid, it has been suggested that it can do "less" and restrict the discretion of the President with respect to foreign aid in any way that it wishes. 8 This article concludes that such may not be the case.
PART I
THE DEVELOPMENT OF CONSTITUTIONAL STANDARDS WITH RESPECT TO THE SEPARATION OF FOREIGN AFFAIRS POWERS
There are no directly relevant court cases involving the separation of powers with respect to foreign aid;' nor are there congressional-executive precedents on all fours with the issues raised in this article; I° nor is there much scholarly writing on the subject."
Therefore, an examination of the constitutional standards developed for foreign affairs generally is necessary. So defined, these standards may then be applied to foreign aid specifically.
EXECUTIVE POWERS
The Constitution has conferred upon the President a wide range of foreign affairs powers: "independent" powers, so-called because they have not been delegated to the President by the Congress. The situation is quite different from that of domestic affairs where the President has few independent substantive powers;1 2 most of the President's vast powers in the domestic area having been delegated. 3 While the Constitution nowhere expressly grants the President powers over "foreign affairs" as such, he has been deemed to derive such authority from a number of other powers which, taken together or separately, have been the subject of express grant:" principally, the "executive power,' ' the powers of "Commander-in-Chief,"' ' and, to a lesser degree, the power to appoint and receive ambassadors . 7 committees-which may over time give rise to constitutional standards accepted by all the branches of government. It has also been suggested that the requirement that the President "shall take care that the laws be faithfully executed," U.S. CONST. art. II, § 3, may be a source of presidential power. Thus, it is this clause that requires Most discussions of the President's foreign affairs powers do not deal with his exclusive powers, with which this article is concerned, but rather with the wider range of his independent powers, and with the treaty power, U.S. CONST. art. II, § 2, cl. 1, which he shares with the Senate.
This article will initially consider both aspects of his powers: the independent powers because their growth has probably enlarged the area of exclusive powers and the treaty power because of the number of useful analogies that it provides.
18. 3 should also be borne in mind."
The Treaty Power
The treaty power 5 5 is not, to be accurate, a purely presidential power; rather, it is an independent power shared by the President and the Senate. 5 However, the shift, early in our history, from Senate to President in the actual implementation of the treaty power, is reminiscent of presidential initiative with respect to the foreign affairs powers and may intimate an inevitability of executive action in external matters.
Senate participation in the treaty power was one of the significant changes that the Constitution worked in the area of foreign affairs-an area previously dominated by the royal 56. That the treaty power is a power independent of congressional 'delegation is revealed by the fact that treaties have often dealt with subjects also entrusted to the Congress. Commerce has been the principal subject, but captures, definitions of international law, and other matters over which Congress has power have also been the subject of treaties. The power to appoint officials, ambassadors and other emissaries, U.S. CONST. art. 11, § 2, cl. 2, shared by the President and Senate, is another power independent of Congress. The Constitution confers many independent powers on the Congress-broadly divisible into the appropriations power and certain substantive legislative powers-which have some bearing on foreign affairs.
The Appropriations Power
The appropriations powerl 6 -which applies to all domestic and foreign affairs-and its basis, the power to tax, 67 are the basic powers of Congress which together constitute the "power of the purse." Denominated the "historic bulwark of legislative matters the need for speed is great, and that you can't go through the long process of submitting a treaty to the Senate. But I do say there is a temptation for officers of Government and particularly for officers of the State Department to try to circumvent the Senate and present the Congress, as in this instance, with an accomplished fact, and I hope that the Bricker amendment will not be revived.
But I can only say that actions such as these will strengthen the movement behind another Bricker amendment. authority," 6 the exercise of this power constitutes "the core legislative process-underpinning all other legislative decisions and regulating the balance of influence between the legislative and executive branches of government." 69 While rhetoric sometimes suggests no limit to the power of the purse, it is, like every other power given by the Constitution, limited: the power of the purse has been "clipped to the dimensions of a constitutional right and must accommodate itself to the entire constitutional scheme." 7 The Supreme Court recognized this in United States v. Butler, 7 where, in striking down the Agricultural Adjustment Act of 1933 as unconstitutional, the Court stated that "the power to spend [is] subject to limitations. ' 7 2 Similarly in United States v. Lovett, 7 3 the Court invalidated a provision in a Defense Department appropriations act, barring payments to certain named persons, characterizing it as a bill of attainder. 4 Both cases stand for the proposition that the power of appropriations is not unlimited, but the exact limits of the power, or, indeed, its exact nature, are unclear. President Monroe thought that "[t]he right of appropriation is nothing more than a right to apply the public money to this or that purpose." 5 Although often called the spending power, this is in fact a misnomer, as it is the executive which spends, "expenditure . . . 75. Corwin-Spending Power 562. But the President must take care to see the laws are faithfully executed, which may entail the expenditure of money. And the executive, if only for the practical reason that it wishes to receive appropriations in subsequent years at comparable or higher levels, feels pressed to spend by the annual congressional appropriations cycle. This is revealed in the description of this process and the related executive budget as "action forcing processes. 
See generally
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It was established in the nineteenth century 7 7 after much controversy that the appropriations power was distinct from the substantive legislative powers of Congress found in Article I, sections 8 and 9 of the Constitution, such as the power to regulate foreign and interstate commerce. 78 The consequences of the distinction between the appropriations power and substantive legislative powers have never been elaborated with respect to foreign affairs, and the clarity of the distinction remains uncertain today." In brief, it has been held that while the substantive powers of Congress give it the power of direction, 80 and regulation, and jurisdiction, 8 the appropriations power confers no more than the power to "finance." ' Although thus limited, it may very well be that the congressional appropriations power draws to itself and is based in part on substantive powers of Congress as well. Consequently, the appropriations bills of both House and Senate are today usually preceded by so-called authorization bills.
3 This is the case as to foreign aid.8 These bills may contain provisions based on such substantive powers, as indeed may appropriations legislation, although limited in this respect by internal rules of the House and 80. See note 89 infra. To be sure, the Congress has fewer such substantive powers with respect to foreign affairs. Cf note 91 infra and accompanying text.
81. Corwin-Spending Power 562. 82. See United States v. Butler, 297 U.S. 1 (1936). Another limit on the appropriations power, although of no relevance to this article and of possibly little significance today, confines it to the application of funds "to matters of national as distinguished from local welfare," Id. at 67. It might be noted that as long ago as 1806 the Congress believed its powers ample enough to include "foreign aid" and appropriated $50,000 for the "wretched sufferers" of an earthquake in Caracas, Venezuela. power that it gives Congress is, paradoxically, the power to withhold appropriations upon which the executive is dependent. "The authority of the Congress to make appropriations, within the framework of the Constitution, is plenary. The power to make appropriations carries with it the power to withhold or deny appropriations. That power has been exercised for generations. This is as fundamental as the Ten Commandments." 6 Although this position has not gone unchallenged, 8 7 it may be accepted for purposes of discussion. A question remains, however, as to the extent to which the "power to withhold or deny" appropriations entirely includes the lesser powers to prescribe conditions, limits, and the like on appropriations that are granted.
"Substantive" Powers of Congress
Program Powers. While the executive and other branches of government could not function very long without appropriations, it is also true that the domestic programs of the executive could not exist without the exercise of Congress's "program" power and the delegation of substantive power by the Congress:
The determination of the functions and activities which the government shall carry on within the Constitution is a legislative matter and therefore the President as general manager has no authority or power to determine functions or activities, except in so far as those powers are especially conferred upon him by the provisions of the Constitution . . . or by the delegation of administrative discretion to him by legislative action. 
L. MERIAM & L. SCHMECKEBREIR, REORGANIZATION OF THE NATIONAL GOVERNMENT:
WHAT DOES IT INVOLVE? 125 (1939) . Such delegations of authority have been called the Congress's "program" power, id., and might be distinguished from other legislative enactments such as criminal laws. As previously noted the executive has few independent substantive powers in the domestic area. See note 12 supra and accompanying text.
89.
It has been suggested that, with respect to domestic matters, as distinguished from foreign and military matters, legislation can be written with any conditions the Congress wishes and with any degree of specificity. are practical limits on the power of Congress to so specify. Thus, it is usually impossible to draft legislation with sufficient specificity to cover every contingency, with the result that discretion must be left to the executive. 0 Congress has substantive legislative powers with respect to certain areas of foreign affairs, 9 ' including such matters as trade, 92 90. Freund suggested there is an irreducible executive discretion-unstandardized power-which he has described as "that residuum of government otherwise subject to law which cannot be reduced to rule." Freund, The Substitution of Rule for Discretion in Public Law, 9 AM. POL. Sc. REv. 666, 670 (1915) . This may be no more than a restatement of the drafting difficulties already averted to.
Another limitation on the power of the Congress to see that all its wishes are enforced arises from the sheer multiplicity of legislation. When it is realized that the amount of enacted legislation is vast and not always wholly consistent, the President, in taking care that "the laws be faithfully executed," will inevitably have to exercise discretion in picking and choosing among the statutes he will implement and the manner in which he will do so. Such a doubtful proposition is not to be confused with another. Where legislation leaves discretion to the executive, as it almost invariably does, the exercise of such discretion is normally not subject to injunction. A final point may be noted. It has often been maintained that legislation should be -general," with its application to specific instances left to the executive. Possibly it is legislation applicable to the public, such as criminal legislation, rather than that applicable to the executive that is contemplated by persons maintaining this position. In any eyent, this ideal has not been reflected in constitutional limitation on the exercise of Congress's substantive or program powers delegating authority to the executive in the domestic area.
91 125 . This kind of administrative detail, which may be common to both domestic and foreign programs, is to be distinguished from the "detail" of conduct and policy, which forms part of the core area of foreign affairs that is immune from congressional control. See note 187 infra and accompanying text. It is also to be distinguished from detailed financial terms to which appropriations may be subject.
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over administration is limited by the President's removal power-a power extending to both domestic and foreign affairs. 05 The extensiveness of these powers in the area of foreign affairs is not well defined." 6 Nevertheless, it is interesting to note that notwithstanding Congress's power to establish offices, the President also has asserted an independent power to do so and has created domestic commissions and offices' 07 as well as diplomatic ones. ' The considerations of democratic political philosophy reflected in the notion of the congressional declaration of war remain, however, and to these we shall briefly return later. 119. See notes 57-60 supra and accompanying text. The protection of states' interests sought to be achieved by Senate participation in the treaty power will be considered in Part I I of this article.
I11. WRIGHT-FOREIGN
120. See Part II of this article.
Vol Independent executive power can only be subject to congressional control if the Congress in turn has independent powers. We have seen that although such congressional powers are limited with respect to foreign affairs, they exist to some undetermined extent with respect to administrative detail and foreign commerce; and it is in these areas that, to an extent probably less than the outer limits of Congress's independent powers, congressional legislation may control the executive. Thus, the Attorney General acknowledged that legislation with respect to the disposition of property somewhat limited President Roosevelt in the proposed exchange in 1940 of 50 destroyers and other property for 99-year leases to British bases. 24 So too, notwithstanding the President's powers as Commander-inChief, the Congress may prescribe rules for the payment of sailors. ' We have seen that the President not only appoints ambassadors and other emissaries, but that until 1855 he was deemed to create their offices. 
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Certain exercises of Congress's constitutional powers, for example, the commerce power, may control the executive. This situation is to be distinguished from that where Congress passes laws which it may lack the constitutional authority to pass, but to which the executive adheres inadvertently or for want of practical power to do otherwise. There are, arguably, a number of illustrations of this, a prominent one being the executive's compliance with many of the present restrictions in the foreign aid legislation, which this article maintains are unconstitutional. Occasionally such congressional faits accomplis are ignored, as, for example, in President Andrew Johnson's refusal to comply with the 1867 Tenure of Office Act, an Act which in retrospect seems clearly unconstitutional,' 18 which almost brought about the President's impeachment .1 9 Professor McDougal has said of one such possible congressionalfait accompli, Moreover, if the subject of the agreement is a matter within the President's special constitutional competence-related, 'for example, to the recognition of a foreign government or to an exercise of his authority as Commander-inChief-a realistic application of the separation of powers doctrine might in some situations appropriately permit the President to disregard the statute as an unconstitutional invasion of his own power.13 128. Myers v. United States, 272 U.S. 52, 167 (1926). 129. Another example is the Act of March 4, 1913, 22 U.S.C. § 1262 (1964), which provides: "The Executive shall not extend or accept any invitation to participate in any international congress, conference, or like event, without first having specific authority of law to do so." The President has of course ignored this statute on many occasions, including the Versailles Peace Conference. It has been said to be "an unconstitutional interference with the President's prerogatives. Since the United States participates in approximately three hundred international conferences each year, it is difficult to determine the extent to which attention has been paid to the act in recent years." Nobleman 155. See note 11 supra. It may not be clear to a President that the law that he proposes to ignore is unconstitutional-and possibly it does not matter to him. In this connection, it is interesting to note some views of President Roosevelt, stated in 1942, anticipating the possible failure of Congress to repeal certain legislation which he believed inhibited his wartime powers:
In the event that the Congress should fail to act, and act adequately, I shall accept the responsibility and I will act . . . . The responsibilities of the President in wartime to protect the Nation are very grave. This total war, with our fighting fronts all over the world, makes the use of Executive power far more essential than in any previous war The relationship of treaties and congressional statutes, a much discussed matter, has only a tangential bearing on the subject of this article. 155. 1967 Hearings 148. And Mr. Garner has written, "In this connection reference may be made to the power of the President in respect to the recognition of foreign states, governments and belligerent powers-a full and completely uncontrolled discretion." Garner, supra note 116, at 291.
156. There are several historic episodes involving congressional efforts to direct the Closely related to the power of recognition is the power' to commence, maintain, and sever' diplomatic relations. The power is exclusively the President's; the Congress cannot prevent such relations or the sending of diplomatic representatives. Thus, in 1876, President, Grant successfully protested against inclusion in the Diplomatic Appropriations Act of a directive that he notify certain diplomatic and consular officers to "close their offices."' 60 An effort to delete funds for a minister to Mexico in 1842 had been defeated for similar reasons, it being noted by Congressman Pickens that the 
CORWIN-FOREIGN RELATIONS 42.
158. This power, like the recognition power, is sometimes said to derive technically from the power to receive and dispatch ambassadors and other emissaries; cf text at note 17 supra. Nor can Congress direct that such relations be commenced"" 4 or specify the ranks of our representatives.' The President, in effect, has exclusive power to control and make policy with respect to the existence of our relations with foreign governments.
It has been suggested that President
The President also has the exclusive power to decide the content and mode of our relations with foreign countries and to conduct the same. Thus, he alone decides whether or not to undertake negotiations, whether it be of a treaty or an executive agreement.,"
The remarks of Benjamin Curtis, a former Associate Justice of the Supreme Court, in defense of President Andrew Johnson at his trial for impeachment, are revealing:
Suppose a law should provide that the President of the United States should not make a treaty with England or with any other country? It would be a plain infraction of his constitutional power, and if an occasion arose when such a treaty was in his judgment expedient and necessary it would be his duty to make it; and the fact that it should be declared to be a high misdemeanor if he made it would no more relieve him from the responsibility of acting through the fear of that law than he would be relieved of that responsibility by a bribe not to act. 67 The President has sole power to determine whether or not an agreement or treaty should be finally concluded, even though the Senate has already ratified it.16s And, while the law with respect to the termination of treaties is in a "somewhat confused state,"" it (1954) . Similarly, the President decides whether or not the government will be represented at a conference, which may be thought of as no more than the occasion for discussion or negotiations. See note 129 supra. Congress has the power not only to raise and support and govern armies but to declare war. It has, therefore, the power to provide by law for carrying on war. This power necessarily 'extends to all legislation essential to the prosecution of war with vigor and success, except such as interferes with the command of the forces and the conduct of campaigns. That power and duty belong to the President as Commander-in-Chief. Both these powers are derived from the Constitution, but neither is defined by that instrument. Their extent must be determined by their nature, and by the principles of our institutions.' 6 The traditional core area is seen, therefore, to embrace the power both to conduct foreign affairs and make policy.' More specifically, papers or information. We do not address directions to the Secretary of State, nor do we direct requests, even to the Secretary of State. We direct requests to the real head of that department, the President of the United States, and, as a matter of courtesy, we add the qualifying words: "If in his judgment it is not incompatible with the public interest". WRIGHT-FOREIGN RELATIONS 322. Cf the immunity of the executive negotiating process from disclosure, note 175 supra. (4) Declarations of war; 9 0 (5) Senate advice and consent to treaties and appointments. Thus, the Constitution, as it has developed, has struck a balance. On one side is exclusive executive power with respect to foreign affairs; on the other, congressional participation.'1 9 an excess of democracy when Congress is overly aggressive in attempting to supervise the conduct of policy, it is a failure of democracy when it fails to participate actively in determining policy objectives and in the making of significant decisions. Id. at 44. Senator Fulbright recognized, however, that there is an "overlap in practice between the shaping and conduct of policy."
Foreign aid provides the closest thing we have to an annual occasion for a general review of American foreign policy. It provides the opportunity for airing grievances, some having to'do with economic development, most of them not, and for the discussion of matters of detail which in many cases would be better left to specialists in the field. It also provides the occasion for a discussion of more fundamental questions, pertaining to America's role in the world, to the areas that fall within and those which exceed its proper responsibilities.
Here, however, we encounter the overlap in practice between the shaping and conduct of policy and, in order to exert our influence on the one, where it is desirable, we have also had to exert it on the other, where it is not. Were the Executive more responsive to'our general recommendations-as expressed in committee reports, conditional proscriptions, and general legislative history-it would be possible for us to be more restrained in our specific restrictions. Id. How may the Senator's dividing line be reconciled with that of the Constitution? Possibly the Senator is not talking about the Constitutional division, but rather one he believes more desirable? Possibly the answer lies in semantics. The Senator's detail-which he leaves to the executive-may indeed include policy forming powers, specifically with respect to foreign aid. Or, it is possible that Senator Fulbright is in error as to the historically established line.
188. Compare the observation of Thomas Jefferson, note 171 supra. 189. The military appropriations and establishment powers should also be considered in this connection.
190. The dividing line between this congressional power and the powers of the Commanderin-Chief is a vexed subject. See 81 HARv. L. REv., supra note 7.
191. This area of exclusive foreign affairs powers is to be distinguished from exclusive domestic executive powers: the removal power and its possible corollary unitary management, executive secrecy, executive immunity from congressional and committee "veto," and the free exercise of such discretion as Congress leaves to it under statutes. "Domestic" may be a misnomer, as some of these powers undoubtedly also apply to foreign affairs. The executive has long asserted the power to withhold documents from Congress in the name of executive The executive position, in which Congress has largely acquiesced, is that it has power to make day-to-day decisions with respect to particular matters, such as the making of a loan, a grant or a contract, the decision to build a project or close a base, or a personnel decision-once the authority to do so has been delegated by legislation-without obtaining subsequent approval from the Congress or any of its committees. This requirement has been called a "committee veto" or "coming into agreement" with a committee. The Congress has the power and the right to grant or deny an appropriation or to enact or to refuse to enact a law; but once an appropriation is made or a law is passed, the appropriation should be administered or the law executed by the executive branch of the Government. In no other way can the Government be efficiently managed or responsibility definitely fixed. The Congress has the right to confer upon its committees full authority for purposes of investigation and the accumulation of information for its guidance, but I do not concede the right, and certainly not the wisdom, of the Congress of endowing a committee of either House or a joint Committee of both Houses with Power to prescribe regulations under which executive departments may operate. Hearings on Separation of Power 203. 192. The illustration is taken from the military area. The selection of a weapons system is assumed to be in the core area. Hearings on Separation of Powers 40 (Senator Stennis: "I feel like in choice of weapons that Congress has the power to decide what certain weapons will be as between weapons. Frankly, I lean somewhat to the idea the Commander-in-Chief has that power under military advice.").
Congressman Bass, during the debate on the RS-70, stated: "It is inconceivable to me that Congress should tell a Commander-in-Chief what weapons system to develop any more than control? It seems clear that the availability of appropriations cannot be conditioned on compliance with directions or prohibitions that Congress could not legislate directly; it may not withhold funds for failure of such compliance. Arguably, "[ilf the practice of attaching invalid conditions to legislative enactments were permissible, it is evident that the constitutional system of the separability of the branches of Government would be placed in the gravest jeopardy."' 99 It has been further asserted that:
The argument that since Congress must provide funds if the President is to enter into effective loan agreements with foreign nations, it may subject the President's authority to prior Congressional approval is spurious. The circumstance that Congress may deny funds does not, of course, authorize it to engraft an unconstitutional condition on the grant of authority to commit such funds . . . . The problem of intrusion into executive functions in impermissible ways is not so easily avoided.m Such unconstitutional limitations can take many forms. For example, as previously discussed Congress sought to sever relations with Russia by withholding funds for the staffing and maintenance of the American Embassy.' Presumably conditions which provided for a withdrawal of all funds from the State Department or merely all funds to support our Embassy in Russia, unless the President withdrew recognition of Russia, would also be invalid. The crux is that the core area may not be in any way trespassed upon by appropriations conditioned in the manner discussed. Such a trespass on the removal power by an appropriations provision was condemned by Judge Madden of the Court of Claims in Lovett v. Congressman Findley has acknowledged Congress's awareness of the difficulty with such conditions:
•.. I am very concerned about the long-term effect of the nuclear proliferation treaty, and at one point I attempted to use the power of the purse in the House to shut off the salaries of any State Department personnel who might use their official time to advance that treaty.
* .* I must add my amendment did not get very far. The House is reluctant to use the power of the purse in specific matters like this.
7
What these conditions do is apply pressure on the executive to do something-or refrain from doing something-or lose appropriations. Such pressure is constitutionally objectionable." 0 8
There is a set of legislative provisions which raises more difficult questions than "conditions," and they arise, again, from the power to withhold appropriations. Congress can withhold appropriations from an entire program;"' can it withhold them from increasingly small segments of a program based on the President's independent powers? Congressman McCormack has said that Congress has the power "not to appropriate money for any particular purpose." ' ' This may be true in the sense that Congress cannot be forced to appropriate funds; yet Congress cannot use this power to prevent the President from recognizing a state or government, dispatching an emissary to it, or specifying the rank of such emissary. 21 1 In this respect, consider the statement of Senator Borah:
Undoubtedly the Congress may refuse to appropriate and undoubtedly the Congress may say that an appropriation is for a specific purpose. In that respect the President would undoubtedly be bound by it. But the Congress could not, through the powers of appropriation, in my judgment, infringe upon the right of the President to command whatever army he might find See also L. WILMERDING, supra note 134, who reports many instances of the executive applying military appropriations to purposes other than those specified on the ground that the appropriations legislation did not meet executive requirements. These latter instances may represent no more than a species of executivefait accompli. See note 46 supra and accompanying text.
212. CORWIN-PRESIDENT 403 n.64.
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At what point is the President's "command" of the foreign aid program "infringed"? Can Congress constitutionally divide the appropriations into categorids of aid, as it has in fact often done, limiting the amount for each? Can it "itemize" or earmark appropriations, saying that so much shall be used for one country and so much for another, or not at all? Congressman Mann believed this could, in effect, be done. As he once phrased it, with respect to an appropriation for the Army, "Our power to limit appropriations is so conclusive that we can say that no money shall be given in this bill except to red-headed men . . ,,'2 Yet if such itemization of State Department appropriations were permitted, Congress might specify the countries where the United States was to . maintain embassies, or the ranks of American emissaries-things over which Congress has no power. 214 Thus, itemization seems too "nice" a way for Congress to avoid the strictures of the Constitution. 215 There are, of course, many ways, short of the kind of statutory controls which this article maintains are proscribed, by which Congress can check and balance the executive, even with respect to the core area. These devices include: (1) various indirect means of persuasion or compulsion and other private communications; (2) clearances with key legislators and understandings which may or may not be binding; (3) committee reports; (4) reports which the executive can be required to make; (5) annual hearings with respect to legislation and appropriations; (6) investigations which, although in theory subject to a limitation that they be for a "legislative purpose," can be a real source of pressure on the executive; (7) annual appropriations, short term authorizations, and fiscal year funds; (8) sense of Congress provisions, resolutions, and similar "advice"; (9) the force of public opinion, the consensus building process, and the prospect of elections; (10) the President's "conscience" and "his sense of self-restraint," possibly the most The legislative department derives a superiority in our governments from other circumstances. Its constitutional powers being at once more extensive, and less susceptible of precise limits, it can, with the greater facility, mask, under complicated and indirect measures, the encroachments which it makes on the co-ordinate departments. It is not infrequently a question of real nicety in legislative bodies, whether the operation of a particular measure, will, or will not extend beyond the legislative sphere. THE FEDERALIST No. 48, at 334 (Cooke ed. 1961) (J. Madison).
